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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 USUN NEW YORK 002077

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SUBJECT: UNSC CONSULTATIONS ON THE SUDAN 10/27

REF: KHARTOUM 02539

Classified By: Ambassador John R. Bolton for reasons 1.4 (b,d).

¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: During an October 27 briefing to the UNSC on the Sudan, UN DPKO U/SYG Jean-Marie Guehenno called for "creativity" to break the diplomatic impasse with Khartoum regarding a UN peacekeeping deployment in Darfur. UK PermRep Emyr Jones Parry presented a UK compromise proposal for a Darfur deployment aimed at balancing military effectiveness, i.e. capacity to implement the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), with Sudanese consent. Delegations responded generally positively to the UK proposal. China, Qatar and Russia concurred with the need to show "flexibility" to attain Sudanese consent, but emphasized the need to move forward with the AMIS support package first. Guehenno also briefed on the deteriorating security conditions along Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) and presented a "light" and a "heavy" option for addressing the problem under the UNSCR 1706 mandate. SRSJ Jan Pronk, who was expelled by the Sudanese Government on October 22, said he believes progress in bringing non-signatories into the DPA and a UN peacekeeping mission are the only solution to the Darfur crisis. USUN Pol Minister Counselor voiced USG support for the SYG statement rejecting Pronk's expulsion and our position that an effective peacekeeping force as outlined in UNSCR 1706 should be pursued. END SUMMARY.

UK Presents Alternative
Deployment Ideas

¶2. (SBU) Guehenno opened his comments on alternative Darfur deployment options by describing the current situation as an "ongoing stalemate." DPKO is prepared to explore "creative" ideas regarding alternative deployment scenarios in a "more private setting" with interested delegations.

¶3. (C) UK AMB Jones Parry spoke first following Guehenno's comments and outlined UK proposals for a compromise solution. The UK proposed an African-led, multinational force, under AU control and financed by the UN under Chapter VIII as a possible compromise the Government of Sudan might accept while ensuring adequate "military effectiveness" (See paragraph 9 for text of the UK proposal). AMB Jones Parry emphasized that his comments were intended to "spark discussion" on ways to break the standoff with Khartoum and not a "finished proposal."

¶4. (SBU) UNSC members greeted the UK proposal with positive comments regarding the need to address Sudanese concerns. France, Argentina, Ghana, Tanzania, Denmark, Greece and Slovakia concurred on the need to balance "flexibility" with "military effectiveness." China, Qatar and Russia agreed that the UK proposal is step towards assuaging Sudanese concerns, but focused on the need to move forward with the AMIS support package first. USUN Pol Minister Counselor responded that the goals for a peacekeeping force in Darfur as outlined in resolution 1706 should be actively pursued. The Security Council must continue to press for the force standards that were articulated in resolution 1706, including the protection of civilians and ensuring humanitarian access.

Chad/CAR Border
Security Deteriorating

¶5. (SBU) Guehenno presented a "light" and a "heavy" option for dealing with the deteriorating security conditions along Sudan's borders with Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). The movement of refugees and the use neighboring countries as rear bases by rebel groups are fueling the increase in violence. Since early October, border violence has increased significantly, most notably with the October 15 rebel seizure of towns deep in the interior of Chad.

¶6. (SBU) Noting the provisions of UNSCR 1706 that provide a mandate to address regional security issues and protect civilians in refugee camps in Chad, Guehenno said UN DPKO has been preparing two options to improve border security:

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-- UN liaison/monitoring mission in Chad and CAR; a light option to include monitoring capacity at key locations for IDPs (several hundred personnel).

-- Multidimensional UN Peacekeeping presence in eastern Chad and northeast CAR; a heavy option to include (several thousand personnel).

Guehenno admitted the capacity of the light option would be limited to monitoring conditions and would likely require some sort of quick reaction force to ensure security. While the "heavy" option would have greater capacity to improve security in border areas, it risked creating a "pull factor" for refugees looking to escape harsher conditions in Darfur. Delegations responded with promises to study the ideas further and communicate them to their capitals.

Pronk Expulsion

¶7. (SBU) SRSG Jan Pronk, who had arrived in New York the day before following his expulsion by the government of Sudan, spoke briefly on the situation in Darfur (reftel). Pronk highlighted the need to find a way to bring non-signatory rebel groups into the DPA and convince the Government of Sudan (GOS) to accept a UN peacekeeping force. Every delegation, with the exception of Qatar, thanked Pronk for his service and voiced support for the October 27 SYG press statement confirming that Pronk will remain the SRSG until his contract expires in January. Guehenno stated that Pronk will return to Sudan for a "reasonable period" of time in order to facilitate the transition to the new SRSG. The Qatari representative made a vague reference to "other information" emanating from Khartoum regarding Pronk's expulsion and said his delegation could not yet comment on the issue. USUN Pol Minister Counselor expressed USG support the UN SYG's statement rejecting Pronk's expulsion.

Text of UK Alternative

Deployment Proposal

18. (SBU) UKUN provided USUN with a copy of their proposal for an alternative deployment in Darfur. The UK outlined the proposal and criteria during consultations, but have not yet distributed the paper to other delegations. In a subsequent meeting with the UK Sudan expert, USUN poloff communicated USG concerns that an AU-led mission would not meet the minimal requirements for an effective peacekeeping deployment. We understand from UKUN that HMG has passed a refined version of their proposal to Main State and the NSC.

19. (SBU) Begin Text:

-- Objective: A robustly mandated, manned and equipped force capable of effective implementation of the DPA and the protection of civilians in Darfur while still being acceptable to Bashir.

-- Concept: A robust African-led multinational force under AU control, but with significant international involvement, including UN support and non-African (i.e. Asian and other Muslim countries,) troops.

-- Force must meet eight criteria:

i. Sufficient troop numbers: approaching the 17,000 the UN estimates is required. The force would re-hat (as UNMIS would have) the better African battalions in AMIS (plus any additional battalions the AU deploys). To bring the force size up to that mandated by 1706, the AU (possibly subcontracting force generation to the UN) would generate additional Asian and Arab contributions (we should target Muslim countries such as Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia and Indonesia).

ii. Sufficient capability/enablers) similar to that a UN force would have had: the force should have a spine of UN and international support (technical, logistical, etc);

iii. Strong, robust mandate, including on protection of

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civilians and the force itself, explicitly linked to implementation of the DPA.

iv. Be composed only of African troops and troops from non-African Muslim countries (but with Western and non-Muslim enablers).

v. A robust African Force Commander who would have headed the UNMIS operation in Darfur. The planning cell under the force commander would be a multinational structure involving UN political, military and financial experts as well as AU staff. Current (or additional) NATO and EU secondees to AMIS could also be included.

vi. Financed by the UN under Chapter VIII of the Charter (regional organisations) and operating with UN structures and accounting requirements.

vii. Have free movement around Darfur without needing prior approval from GoS.

viii. Have a chain of command to the AU in Addis but with UN consultation (e.g. on finance issues). Although the force would be responsible primarily to the AU, it could also (via its head of mission or Konare) report to the Security Council.

-- The deal with Bashir: In return for the international community accepting an AMIS Plus force (instead of UNMIS), Sudan must agree:

i. to work with the AU (supported by the UN) on moving forward the political process in Darfur. In particular, the

establishment of conditions for a cease-fire in Darfur, the launch of Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation and the opening of negotiations with the DPA non-signatories;

ii. to the full opening of humanitarian corridors and the free movement of humanitarian personnel;

iii. to accelerating UN support to AMIS in the meantime (as AIF would take time to deploy). First batch of support (105 UN personnel) must be deployed ASAP, with UN numbers increasing to 1,000 (UN heavy package of support) as soon as possible thereafter.

iv. to free movement of support/enablers/equipment for the force into Sudan/Darfur.

-- Sudan must be clear that without agreement to such a force, the international community will pursue the imposition of sanctions against it.

-- Next steps: getting diplomatic agreement: UN/AU/AL to agree concept with Bashir. AU would then approve the mandate, which would be endorsed by the UN in a new SCR (any force increase would also have to be approved by the UN). Approval to Chapter VIII financing would also need approval from the Fifth (Budget) Committee of the GA as well as by a two-thirds of the GA plenary.

End Text.

COMMENT

¶10. (C) While it is useful to pursue alternatives in the face of Bashir's refusal to consent to a UN peacekeeping mission, the UK concept needs careful vetting. We should continue to pursue a "unity of command" solution for Darfur, and avoid recommendations that would establish a hybrid AU/UN command structure that would be fraught with problems.

BOLTON